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Abstract 
Perception of affordance is enhanced not only when that object is located in one’s own 
peripersonal space, as compared to when it is located within extrapersonal space, but also when 
the object is located in another person’s peripersonal space (as measured by a Spatial Alignment 
Effect (SAE)). It has been suggested that this reflects the existence of an Interpersonal Body 
Representation (IBR) that allows us to represent the perceptual states and action possibilities of 
others. Here, we address the question of whether IBR can be modulated by higher-level/reflective 
social cognition, such as judgments about one’s own social status. Participants responded with 
either the right or the left hand as soon as a go signal appeared. The go signal screen contained a 
task-irrelevant stimulus consisting of a 3D scene in which a mug with a left-facing or right-facing 
handle was positioned on a table. The mug was positioned either inside or outside the reaching 
space of the participants. In a third of the trials, the mug was positioned within the reaching space 
of an avatar seated at the table. Prior to this task we induced an experience of social ostracism in 
half of the participants by means of a standardized social exclusion condition. The results were 
that the SAE that normally occurs when the mug is in the avatar’s reaching space is extinguished 
by the induced social exclusion. This indicates that judgments about one’s own social status 
modulate the effect of IBR.  
Keywords: Interpersonal Body Representation; Affordance; Social Exclusion; Spatial Compatibility 
Effect. 
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Introduction 
The term ‘interpersonal body representation’ (IBR), (Thomas et al. 2006) refers to a 
putative visual–tactile association mechanism for representing our own bodies that might also be 
used for representing the bodies of other people. Thomas and colleagues (2006) used a cueing 
paradigm to investigate the role of this spatial mapping in the processing of sensory events on 
one’s own or another’s body. Cues consisted in brief flashes of light at one of several locations on 
the other’s body, while the target was a tactile stimulus delivered either at the same (congruent) 
or at a different (incongruent) anatomical location on the participant’s body as the visual cue. 
There was a significant congruency effect for anatomical body position, as participants were faster 
at detecting tactile stimuli on their own body when a visual stimulus was delivered at the same 
location on the other’s body. Crucially, this effect was body-specific, not occurring when visual 
cues were delivered at a non-bodily object (e.g. a house). Thomas and colleagues suggested that 
this body-specific congruency effect is an outcome of the workings of an IBR. The IBR was 
proposed to be an automatic sensory mechanism for visual–tactile association that underlies 
“understanding of others’ perceptual states” and “may reflect a first step towards the human 
ability to track the specific, detailed contents of other minds” (Thomas et al., 2006, p. 328).  
Recently we suggested with behavioral and neurophysiological studies that such an IBR 
exists not only in the visuo-tactile, but also in the motor domain (Cardellicchio et al. 2012; 
Marcello Costantini et al. 2011c). In those studies we investigated whether and to what extent the 
perception of affording features of objects, which have been shown to be modulated by the 
spatial relation between the perceiver and object (Marcello Costantini et al. 2011a; Marcello 
Costantini et al. 2011b; M Costantini et al. 2010; M. Costantini and Sinigaglia 2012; Ferri et al. 
2011), may be influenced by the presence of another individual. In particular, in the behavioral 
4 
 
study (Marcello Costantini et al. 2011c), we took advantage of the spatial alignment effect (SAE) 
paradigm.  
Participants were asked to imitate a seen grasping motor act with their right or left hand 
when presentated with a task-irrelevant go signal. The go signal was a 3D scene with a mug placed 
on a table with its handle oriented toward the right or the left, that is, the go signal was spatially 
congruent or incongruent with the grasping movement that the participant was about to imitate. 
The mug could be located either within the peripersonal (30 cm) or extrapersonal (150 cm) space 
of the participants. Notably, an avatar was seated on a chair at the table in some trials, while in 
others a virtual non-corporeal object (a cylinder) with the same volume as the avatar was “seated” 
on the chair. We found that the SAE occurred not only when the affording object was presented 
within the reaching space of the participant but also when it was presented within the 
peripersonal space of the avatar. In other world, results showed that the presence of a potential 
co-actor triggers a mapping of another’s peripersonal space onto the participants’ peripersonal 
space, representing the out-of-reach object as ready-to-hand for the other individual. We 
speculated that the matching between the representation of the space surrounding the body of 
another with the representation of the action space of our own bodies provides us with an 
immediate pre-comprehension of the other’s body as an acting body as well as allowing us to 
comprehend the effective range of the other’s bodily agency. 
 
Thus, both Thomas et al.’s (2006) and Costantini et al.’s (Cardellicchio et al. 2012; Marcello 
Costantini et al. 2011c) data points in the same direction, suggesting the existence of pre-
reflective mechanisms (IBR) allowing us to represent others’ perceptual states and motor 
possibilities. Such pre-reflective mechanisms have been proposed as forming the basis of human 
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social cognition. But how deeply is our ability to represent others’ perceptual states and motor 
possibilities implicated in social cognition? Is such an ability sensitive to the social dimension in 
which it is instantiated (Bernhard Hommel et al. 2009; Iani et al. 2011)? Indeed, the ways in which 
social context interacts with these mechanisms is poorly understood and it is not known whether 
IBR is influenced by higher-level/reflective social cognition. If it is, then it should be sensitive to the 
manipulation of social variables and depend on an agent’s judgments of the social aspects of a 
given situation. One possible such social variable is the experience of social exclusion, which 
arguably is the outcome of a reflective judgment. This is shown by the fact that such experience is 
sensitive to whether you have been excluded, for instance, by members of your own group or by 
out-group members (Gonsalkorale and Williams 2007). 
Here, we provide some empirical data that can help shed new light on the range of these 
mechanisms. In particular we investigated the impact of an induced experience of social exclusion 
on the understanding of others’ motor possibilities by taking advantage of the SAE paradigm. As in 
the previous behavioral study (Marcello Costantini et al. 2011c), participants were asked to 
provide a response, with either their right or their left hand, on presentation of a task-irrelevant 
go signal represented by a 3D scene with a mug placed on a table, its handle oriented towards the 
right or the left (i.e., congruent or not with the responding hand). The mug could be located either 
within or outside the reaching space of the participants, but in a third of the trials, it was close to 
another virtual individual that was seated on a chair at the table. In half of the participants, we 
induced an experience of social ostracism by means of a standardized social exclusion condition, 
that is, using the Cyberball game (Williams et al. 2000). In this paradigm, the participant and two 
other supposed players (which in fact are computer generated) played a virtual ball-tossing game, 
during which the degree of social inclusion is controlled by the manipulation of the number of 
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throws received from the computer-generated players. Included participants receive the ball 
regularly throughout the game while ostracized participants receive only the first two throws. 
Previous research on this paradigm indicates that ostracized participants not only perceive 
themselves as being excluded but also have lower satisfaction of fundamental needs than non-
ostracized participants (Williams et al. 2000; Zadro et al. 2004). For example, one such 
fundamental need is belongingness, defined as the human need to be an accepted member of a 
group. We hypothesized that social exclusion does have an effect on understanding of others’ 
motor possibilities, and hence, that only participants who had been excluded would show a lack of 
SAE when the mug is outside their reaching space but close to the virtual avatar. 
Methods 
Participants 
Forty female participants (mean age (SD): 23.25 (3.33) years) took part in the study. They were 
randomly assigned to either the Inclusion or the Ostracism group according to the experimental 
manipulation of their inclusionary status (20 participants for each group). We choose to include 
only female participants because it has been suggested that they are more sensitive to the 
ostracism effects induced by the Cyberball game (Sebastian et al. 2010; Weik et al. 2010). 
All participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, were 
naive as to the purposes of the experiment, and gave their written informed consent. The study 
was approved by the Ethics Committee of the ‘‘G. d’Annunzio’’ University, Chieti, and was 
conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.  
Stimuli 
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In the experimental task, two sets of colour images (1024 × 768 pixels) were used. The first one 
included coloured pictures depicting either a right or a left hand pantomiming a precision grip 
movement (instruction stimuli), while the second one included 3D scenes (go stimuli). These 
scenes were created by means of 3DStudioMax™ and depicted 3D virtual rooms in which there 
was a table with a mug on it (geometric field of view value: ≈75 horizontal degrees; Fig. 1). The 
mug was placed either within the peripersonal (50 cm) or in the extrapersonal (150 cm) space of 
the participants, and its handle was oriented either to the right or to the left. In one third of the 
trials, an avatar was seated on a chair on the long side of the table, facing the object, while in 
another third of the trials a non-corporeal object, namely a cylinder, was placed on the same chair. 
When either the avatar or the cylinder was present it was seated on the same side of the table as 
that toward which the handle was directed, thus being placed either on the right or on the left 
side of the table. It is important to note here that when the avatar was present, the mug was 
placed within his peripersonal space (i.e., the mug was perceived as reachable by the avatar, as 
confirmed by a pilot study). Stimuli were presented by means of a LCD monitor (1024×768 pixels). 
All stimuli were displayed on a black background, from a viewing distance of 57 cm. 
Figure 1 near here 
Procedure 
Social inclusion manipulation – After obtaining informed consent, participants were told that the 
study involved the effects of mental visualization on their pantomime ability, and that to assist 
them in practicing their skills at mental visualization they would be playing an Internet game with 
other confederates. Participants were thus asked to play the Cyberball game (Williams et al. 2000; 
Williams and Jarvis 2006), a virtual ball tossing game that induces social exclusion in a highly 
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standardized manner. In this paradigm, participants were led to believe that they were playing 
over the internet with two other people who are taking part in similar experiments but who are, in 
fact, computer generated (see (Williams and Jarvis 2006) for a complete description).  
We manipulated the degree of social inclusion (ostracized or included) via the number of times 
participants received the ball from other players. Participants in the inclusion condition received 
the ball for roughly one-third of the total throws, while those in the exclusion condition received 
the ball only twice at the beginning of the game. The game was set for 40 total throws, 
corresponding to approximately 6 min. At the end of the game, the website instructed participants 
to inform the experimenter that they had finished, and they were then asked to perform the 
spatial alignment effect task (see below). Note that the other players in the Cyberball game were 
not presented to the participants in a way that resembled the avatar used in the go stimulus for 
the SAE task. 
Spatial alignment effect task – Each trial began with the presentation of a white fixation cross at 
the centre of the screen followed by presentation of the instruction stimulus for 150 ms. After a 
variable delay (150-450 ms), the go stimulus was presented for 500 ms. Participants were 
requested to operate on a button box with the hand presented in the instruction stimulus as soon 
as the go stimulus appeared. Thus, congruent trials refer to the condition in which participants had 
to respond with either the right or the left hand when the handle of the mug (presented in the go 
stimulus) was located ipsilaterally; on the contrary, incongruent trials refer to the condition in 
which the responding hand and the handle were in opposite hemispaces. At the beginning of each 
trial, participants rested their right and left index fingers on two response buttons arranged 
horizontally on a button box. Responses were given by lifting the index finger of the responding 
hand. Reaction times were recorded and analyzed off-line. 
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Each participant performed the SAE task right after the social manipulation (see above). The task 
was composed of 192 trials. The presentation of the stimuli and the recording of participants’ 
responses were controlled by a custom software (developed by Gaspare Galati at the Department 
of Psychology, Sapienza Università di Roma, Italy; (Gaspare Galati et al. 2011; G. Galati et al. 2008), 
implemented in MATLAB (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, USA) using Cogent 2000 (developed at 
FIL and ICN, UCL, London, UK) and Cogent Graphics (developed by John Romaya at the LON, 
Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, UCL, London, UK).  
Basic Needs Questionnaire – After completing the SAE task (see above), participants were asked to 
complete a questionnaire (Zadro et al. 2004). To assess the effectiveness of the social inclusion 
manipulation, participants estimated the percentage of throws they received and rated on nine-
point scales how much they were included and accepted during the game. The questionnaire also 
contained twelve questions that prompted the participants to assess their felt level of satisfaction 
for four basic needs during the game: belonging, control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence 
(the satisfaction of each need was assessed by three items). Mood was also assessed using four 
nine-point bipolar questions: bad/good, happy/sad, tense/relaxed, and aroused/not aroused (see 
Table 1).  
Results 
Basic Needs Questionnaire – To assess the effectiveness of our Cyberball manipulation, we 
compared the average score of participants in the inclusion and ostracism conditions by means of 
two-sample two-tailed t-tests. There were three manipulation checks assessing inclusionary 
status. As expected, participants in the ostracism condition reported that they felt significantly less 
included and accepted than participants in the inclusion condition, and also reported to have 
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received a lower percentage of throws (all ts(38) > |4.92|, all ps < .001) (see Table 1). We next 
computed the average for the items assessing each need and the mood, as a reasonable level of 
internal consistency was found (all Cronbach’s alpha coefficients > .62). Ostracized participants 
reported lower basic needs satisfaction, as well as less positive affect, than did included 
participants (all ts(38) > |3.21|, all ps < .003). These results confirm that our manipulation of social 
inclusion was effective. 
Table 1 near here 
Spatial alignment effect – Trials in which participants failed to respond correctly (3.27%) or with a 
response time lower than 100 ms (3.28%) were discarded from the analysis on RTs. We then 
calculated the mean RTs for each condition, and responses longer than two standard deviations 
from the individual mean were treated as outliers and were not considered (4.36% of the dataset). 
Data were entered in a 2×2×3×2 mixed-model ANOVA with inclusionary Status (inclusion vs. 
ostracism) as the between-subjects factor, and Location of the object (relative to the participant: 
peripersonal vs. extrapersonal space), Presence of another individual (absent vs. cylinder vs. 
avatar) and Congruency (between the responding hand and the handle of the mug: congruent vs. 
incongruent) as within-subjects factors. Paired-sample two-tailed t-tests were performed where 
necessary. 
RT analysis revealed a significant Congruency main effect (F(1,38) = 8.28, p = .007, ηp2 = .18), with 
RTs in congruent trials (360.8 ms) that were faster than those in incongruent trials (370.9 ms). 
Moreover, the Congruency effect was modulated by the Location of the object (F(1,38) = 10.57; p 
= .002; ηp2 = .22). Simple effect analysis revealed a reliable SAE in the peripersonal condition (i.e., 
higher RTs in incongruent compared to congruent trials: 372.8 and 356 ms, respectively; t(39) = 
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|5.2|, p < 0.001), but not on extrapersonal trials (incongruent and congruent trials: 369 and 365.5 
ms, respectively; t(39) = |0.85|, p = 0.4); in addition, RTs in congruent trials were faster in 
peripersonal than in extrapersonal space (t(39) = |2.54|; p = 0.015). Finally, the higher order 4-
way interaction resulted significant (F(2,76) = 3.77, p = .027, ηp2 = .09) (see Fig. 2). In order to 
better understand this latter result, we performed two separate 2×3×2 mixed-model ANOVAs on 
peripersonal and extrapersonal trials, with inclusionary Status as the between-subjects factor, and 
Presence of another individual and Congruency as within-subjects factors. 
The ANOVA on peripersonal trials confirmed the significant Congruency main effect (F(1,38) = 
24.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .40), with faster RTs in congruent compared with incongruent trials. No 
further significant effects were found (all Fs < 1.14, all ps > .33, all ηp2s < .03). On the contrary, the 
ANOVA on extrapersonal trials revealed a significant inclusionary status by Presence by 
Congruence interaction (F(2,76) = 3.48, p = .036, ηp2 = .08). Simple effect analysis revealed a 
reliable SAE only for the inclusion group when the avatar was present (incongruent and congruent 
trials: 363.1 and 343.9 ms, respectively; t(39) = |2.38|, p = 0.028), indicating that participants who 
experienced a social inclusion event mapped the peripersonal space of the avatar. Crucially, the 
SAE on avatar trials was annulled in the ostracized group (incongruent and congruent trials: 378.3 
and 389.8 ms, respectively; t(39) = |1.94|, p = 0.067). Please note that in this condition 
participants tend to be faster in incongruent as compared to congruent trials (Fig. 2).   
Figure 2 near here 
Regression analysis – Finally, we performed a correlation analysis to better verify if the 
experienced ostracism, as assessed by our participants’ needs satisfaction and mood, was effective 
in modulating the mapping of the avatar’s peripersonal space. With this aim, we first computed 
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the (remapped) spatial alignment effect in the extrapersonal space in the presence of the avatar 
(RSAE). The RSAE value was calculated for each participant as the difference between invalid and 
valid trials in this condition. Next, we performed a series of regression analyses between the RSAE 
of our participants and their basic needs and mood scores. The analysis revealed that all the 
questionnaire scores significantly predicted the RSAE (all βs > .34, all ts(38) > 2.21, all ps < .03) and, 
in particular, the questionnaire score that best predicted the RSAE was the need to belong (β > 
.45, t(38) > 3.11, p < .004; Fig. 3). Note that these results remained the same after eliminating two 
outliers (standardized residual > |2|). To sum up, regression analyses indicate that participants’ 
mapping of the peripersonal space of another potential actor was modulated by threat to their 
need for belongingness. 
Figure 3 near here 
Discussion  
There is evidence that the other’s bodily space might be mapped onto one’s own body 
representation. Earlier behavioral and neurophysiological studies (Cardellicchio et al. 2012; 
Marcello Costantini et al. 2011c; M. Costantini and Sinigaglia 2012; Thomas et al. 2006) have 
shown that a visuo-tactile as well as a motor mapping can be found in humans at the level of 
bodily (or personal) and peripersonal space. These mapping mechanisms have collectively been 
called IBR – Interpersonal body representations - and been taken to be pre-reflective mechanisms 
that allow us to “track the specific, detailed contents of other minds” (Thomas et al. 2006). 
From a theoretical point of view, something like the IBR is to be expected by the common coding 
theory (B. Hommel et al. 2001). This theory claims that perceptual representations (e.g. of things 
we can see) and motor representations (e.g. of hand actions) are linked, since the same 
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representation (a common code) is shared by both perception and action. This is the case not only 
within one individual but also across individuals: the same representation is used in the perception 
of another’s unfolding action and in the planning of one’s own unfolding action. This mapping 
ought to hold also between the perception of another’s action possibilities and the appreciation of 
our own action possibilities. Hence, the “common code” could play an important role in enabling 
us to predict what others are likely to do given the situation they are in. However, note that while 
IBR is supposed to be a particular kind of representation that relates the bodily and peripersonal 
spaces of self and other, according to the common code explanation there is simply no distinction 
between self-performed actions and other perceived events at the level of the common code (B. 
Hommel et al. 2001). In other words, the common code approach assumes that features of events 
that actually relate to others are not treated differently from features of events related to oneself. 
This feature of action planning and action perception could then be exploited in order to 
understand others without reliance on a specific mapping mechanism. Perhaps appeal to an IBR is 
compatible with this common code explanation—the IBR could be the outcome of a more basic 
common code—but we will here frame the discussion of the results in terms of IBR.  
 
Given that there is an IBR in the visuo-tactile domain, it is plausible that there is also an IBR in the 
motor domain, as suggested by Costantini and colleagues (Cardellicchio et al. 2012; Marcello 
Costantini et al. 2011c; M. Costantini and Sinigaglia 2012). After all, we have many representations 
of our own body in different formats, ranging from amodal abstract descriptions to visuo-tactile 
maps and motor maps. (If the common coding theory holds, then we should also expect that all 
these representations are shared, irrespective of format.) 
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While IBR may underpin a basic form of apprehension of others’ action possibilities and perceptual 
states, it is clearly not the only important mechanism that underpins social cognition. High-level 
reflective processes such as in-group/out-group discriminations and inferential mental state 
attributions are also important. There are interesting questions concerning the interactions 
between these levels. Clearly, it is possible that pre-reflective mechanisms enable higher-level 
reflective processes. But it is also interesting to consider whether and how higher-level reflective 
processes may modulate pre-reflective mechanisms. That psychological effects can be modulated 
by one’s experienced social status has been found in other studies (Bernhard Hommel et al. 2009; 
Kuhbandner et al. 2010). One such effect is the Social Simon effect. The standard version of this 
effect (Simon and Rudell 1967 ) is observed when people give a spatially defined response, such 
as pressing one of two (left/right) buttons located side-by-side, to a non-spatial feature (such as 
the colour) of a stimulus that includes some spatial information (such as location or direction) that 
is either congruent or incongruent with the response. Reaction times are slower when there is no 
correspondence between the spatial information in the stimulus and the responding hand. The 
effect has been shown to occur not only when acting and perceiving in isolation, but also when 
acting and perceiving in a social context (Sebanz et al. 2006a; Sebanz et al. 2003; Sebanz et al. 
2006b; Sebanz et al. 2007). Strikingly, Hommel and colleagues (2009) demonstrated that the social 
version of the Simon effect is modulated by a social manipulation. They instructed participants to 
perform a Social Simon task with either a cooperative or a competitive co-actor. They found that 
the Social Simon effect occurs only if actor and co-actor are involved in a positive relationship, but 
not if they were involved in a negative relationship. 
In order to determine how IBR is related to higher-level processes, we have investigated whether 
it is sensitive to one of many possible social factors, namely social exclusion. We could have used 
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other social manipulations, such as cooperative versus competitive context (see e.g., (Bernhard 
Hommel et al. 2009), but we chose social exclusion because it effects how we relate to others in 
general rather than to a specific cooperative/competitive partner. 
Our results suggest that this mechanism can be modulated by a social manipulation such as social 
exclusion. With our current data we are not able to say whether this influence is direct or indirect 
since the behavioral outcome would be the same. However, what we can say is that IBR is 
associated with the social world. The question is: how do reflective judgments about the social 
world influence the pre-reflective IBR? 
One possibility is that this top-down modulation is actually influencing where the participant 
focuses his or her attention. It has been shown that attention is a necessary condition for low-level 
sensory-motor mechanisms to be activated. For instance, in the domain of affordance perception, 
Tipper et al. (S. Tipper et al. 2006; S. P. Tipper 2010) instructed participants to report the colour of 
door-handles presented on a computer screen, thus focusing their attention on a non-action 
relevant object feature. They found that no SAE occurred in this condition. In our case, it might be 
that social exclusion makes it less likely that the participant’s attention will be captured by what 
the other is attending to, since social exclusion makes one attend less to others in general. When 
the SAE occurs, it is because the attention of the other drives the allocation of our own attentional 
resources toward the object. In the social exclusion condition then, the absence of SAE when the 
object is in the other’s reaching space, would be due to the fact that the participant’s attention is 
not being captured by the other’s attention in the normal way.  
This interpretation of our results is in line with the findings of Van Baaren and colleagues (2003). 
They investigated whether or not priming participants with either interdependent or independent 
self-construal words would influence nonconscious mimicry (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). According 
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to social psychologists, independent self-construal accentuates self-related features and minimizes 
the influence of others in the self-schema, resulting in a bounded and autonomous self that is 
distinctly separate from others. Conversely, the interdependent self-construal represents inclusion 
of others in the self, particularly with regard to others who are part of important relationships, as 
well as in-group members from small, well-connected groups (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; 
Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Yuki). They found that experimental induction 
of independent self-construals produced less nonconscious mimicry than interdependent self-
construals. According to the authors, different self-construals involve differences in information 
processing. A context-independent processing style tends to lead to perceptual differentiation and 
a tendency to ignore contextual and background factors (Nisbett et al., 2001), which would likely 
lead to increased attention to the self and decreased attention to others; thus, fewer mannerisms 
of others would be observed, decreasing the likelihood of mimicry. In contrast, a processing style 
that is context-dependent and involves assimilation would subsequently lead to behavioral 
assimilation, because more attention is paid to the contextual environment and changes within it, 
making mannerisms more noticeable or more likely to be mimicked. 
As a possible objection to this hypothesis, one might argue that the lack of SAE is rather due to a 
general decrease of cognitive resources induced by social exclusion. Indeed, social exclusion 
appears to disrupt cognitive functioning in general, leading to decreased attentional capacities and 
processing speed (Baumeister et al. 2002). This would explain the lack of SAE in the social 
exclusion/extrapersonal condition, but we should then also expect there to be a lack of SAE when 
the participant has been socially excluded and the object is in her own reaching space. However, 
the social exclusion manipulation selectively eliminates the SAE in the extrapersonal space 
condition only. Our results are therefore consistent with the hypothesis that social exclusion 
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selectively redirects attentional resources away from the other, but not with the competing 
hypothesis that any reduction in attentional resources will eliminate SAE. We suggest that the 
redirection of attention away from the other has the effect that IBR is not instantiated. According 
to this suggestion the instantiation or non-instantiation of IBR is not directly influenced by 
reflective social judgments, yet it is indirectly influenced through changes in attentional focus that 
those social judgments produce. Crucially, we claim that if differences in attentional focus 
between conditions have a part to play in the explanation of whether IBR is instantiated, then 
those differences in attentional focus are themselves to be explained by judgments about social 
inclusion and exclusion.  
Research on the possible link between high-level social cognition and pre-reflective mechanisms is 
still in its infancy. Future studies should look at the impact of other social manipulations on IBR. In 
our study we induced a feeling of exclusion, but other social manipulations could be carried out. 
For example, it would be interesting to compare the effect of competitive versus cooperative 
engagement on IBR, and the extent to which cultural identity and ethnicity impact IBR (Colzato et 
al. 2010). 
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Figure 1. Go stimuli used in the Spatial alignment effect task. 
Figure 2. Mean response times (RTs) in the experimental conditions. Error bars represent within-
subjects standard errors (Morey 2008). *p<.05 
Figure 3. Regression plot showing the significant correlation between the global questionnaire 
score for the belonging basic-need and the remapped spatial alignment effect (RSAE, see text for 
details). 
Table 1: Mean (SD) of the questionnaire scores for both included and ostracized participants  (1= 
not at all to 9 = very much so for all scales, unless otherwise stated). The statistics for the Included 
vs. Ostracized comparisons (two-tailed two-samples t-tests) are also showed in the rightmost 
columns. 
 
 
